Name: MENA Conflict - The Risk of Wider War
Uploaded: 2026-10-21T13:45:16.457Z
Duration: 38 min 2 s
Description: MENA Conflict - The Risk of Wider War

Transcript for "MENA Conflict - The Risk of Wider War": Hello, everyone, and welcome. Thank you so much for joining us for this discussion on the latest developments in The Middle East. I'm Larry Henderson. I'm the director of strategic intelligence at Crisis24, and I'm pleased to be joined by two colleagues, Dyan, who brings our regional perspective from her vantage point in Paris on The Middle East, and Jackson, who is based in The US. And he's gonna help us translate developments on the ground into practical security and operational considerations. Dyan, Jackson, thank you for being here. I know you live and breathe crisis, and I think our audience will really value your perspective on developments in The Middle East. So, we've been following the conf... Confrontation in The Middle East now since, I think, February. And one thing is clear to me, the end game remains uncertain. Despite months of pressure, military activity, diplomacy, the risk of further escalation is still very real. As the conflict has evolved, the concern today, I think, isn't simply what is going on between Washington and Tehran. The fighting spread as we've seen in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Red Sea, those are all increasingly the battleground, points of the conflict. I think you'd agree, Dyan, the America's allies and regional partners, they're not necessarily looking at risk in in the same way. Some are focused on deterrence, others on protecting their economies or their domestic stability. And many, I think, are trying to preserve room for diplomacy. The recent Saudi Houthi tensions illustrate how quickly the picture can change and become more complicated on the ground. With that, our aim today isn't to predict a specific outcome. Really, it's to examine the decisions, the the pressure points that could shape what happens next. And importantly, Jackson, it's it's really thinking about the organizations whom we support and how we can provide that type of advice as they operate and navigate on the ground. So with that, Dyan, let me let me start with you. What's driving the latest Saudi Houthi tensions, and what do both sides think they can achieve through military escalation? That's a good question. Well, this latest escalation connects actually three timeline. The first one is the original conflict for the control of Yemen that emerged in twenty fourteen, twenty fifteen between the Ah Houthis and the Saudi led international coalition that is supporting the UN recognized Yemeni government. The second timeline is the Iran US conflict that now focuses on the control of the Strait Of Omeros and economic pressure at adding another layer. And then finally, the current timeline, which is the Saudi Ah Houthi confrontation that began mid July. Now if Saiz believes military pressure can improve its negotiating position, which makes the immediate compromise harder. So how did we get here? Because as we remember, on the twenty twenty two UN truce, sharply reduced major fighting, although it formally expired that October 2022, but it it remained relatively in place. So despite the subsequent regional escalation and the Houthis involvement in the Red Sea confrontation in 2024, the truce mostly held. Houthi attacks on shipping presented support for Palestinians, brought US and British strikes and expanded the movement's regional role. But the actual truth began to erode following the July 13 attack of this year on Sana'a Airport's runway, which was intended to prevent an Iranian aircraft carrying Abu Dhabi delegation from landing. The Yemeni recognized government claimed responsibility, but the Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia for it. And, subsequently, they declared a maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia and claimed attacks on Saudi tankers. The current escalation formally escalated when the Houthis launched offense... An offensive to expand their territory within Yemen and subsequently claimed control of the Bab El Mandeb Strait in September and then increased their attack against Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, supported the Yemeni government counter offensive, which success remains uncertain. Galahoutis have increased targeting within Saudi Arabia, first focusing on military bases, mostly in the South, and then it expanded to energy infrastructure. We remember the East West pipeline, targeting, and now it's also expanded to airports across the country. Now you asked what each site believe they can achieve with military escalation. The Houthis goals and strategy remain centered on their demands, which includes, ending Saudi support for the government's counter offensive, first and foremost, then lifting restrictions on Houthis controlled ports and airports, which started the escalation, if you remember, with the Sana'a Airport. And then also securing salaries and compensations for their government and their public servants and recognition of their territorial extensions. And then finally, they want access to Yemen's oil and gas resources. This strategy combines territorial advances with pressure on Saudi economic life. Airport disruptions and threats to energy facilities can create bargaining leverage without requiring victory over Saudi conventional forces. So the Houthi can regard survival, territorial gains, and economic disruptions as successes even while suffering considerable military losses. On the other hand, Saudi goals and strategy is a bit different. Riyadh's immediate priorities are to protect its population, maintain functioning airports and energy exports, stop further, Houthi advances, and preserve a viable Yemeni partner. Saudi Arabia is using air power mainly against missile infrastructure while supporting the government aligned forces. The limitation is both political and operational because destroying targets in Yemen does not immediately produce a cohesive Yemeni forces that that is able to hold the territory. Now Saudi Arabia wants enough military pressure to restore deterrence, which has been weakened in the past month, and enable negotiations. Achieving that without another prolonged war is the central difficulty. This is particularly true as the Yemeni forces remain divided just as the international community in its response to the escalation remains divided. So I hope that answers the question. Thanks, Dyan. Yeah. It's just so useful to have the the... First, the history and the context to really understand the conflict. And then I think it's it's really useful also to understand the goals of the of the different parties. So thank you for that perspective. Let me... If if if I will, let me drill down a little further on this, Dyan. Which, when we talk about flashpoints and we look at the trajectory of this conflict, which targets or incidents, be it strikes on energy infrastructure, which we've seen some already, disruption of Red Sea shipping or tax on US forces. Would you say carry the greatest risk of triggering what we have as the title of this, this recorded session, a a wider war? Well, I think the most dangerous incident would actually combine substantial casualties, which you mentioned, but also strategic economic damage and pressure on an outside power to respond. So what we're seeing is different, pressure points. The first one, which would be a deadly attack on US forces, which would be the clearest potential trigger for direct American intervention and attacking US personnel at a military base that is in Saudi Arabia or even a tanker or a ship in the Red Sea or an original facility in Riyadh or in one of the main cities made continued restraint politically much harder. The escalation pathway could move from retaliation against Houthi launch capabilities, as we've seen in 2024 and 2025, to an Iranian linked assets if Washington judge Tehran directly responsible, and that would broaden the war significantly. However... And that's a big however. At the moment, we don't see it at the main, the main possibility because The US and the Houthis, technically speaking, have a ceasefire in place since May 2025 that was focused on the commercial shipping and the Red Sea shipping after the the attacks. And reports indicate that they held direct discussions during which the Houthis has specifically told Washington that they won't be targeted directly and that commercial shipping in the Red Sea that is not linked to Saudi Arabia will be spared. So that's a significant, de escalation pathway. A second trigger for, broader escalation would be a mass casualty event, especially one involving, airports and and air care... Aircraft carriers. We saw repeated, attacks against Saudi airports, especially the big one on October 10 on Riyadh Airport that led to at least 13 kills. Saudi officials said that in October only, Riyadh Airport has been targeted 20 times, which is significant, and that does not even include other airports including Daman and other cities. A strike on a passenger aircraft, especially involving several nationalities, could internationalize demands for retaliation, and that's a significant escalation trigger. Now another one, would also include, maritime incident because as we remember, it's also focused on the Babal Mountains Strait. So an incident involving sinking a merchant vessel causing a major spill, especially old spill in the Red Sea or striking a warship in the Red Sea because there's significant military presence around the Belmont District with GBT just in France, could lead to significant escalation. Shipping can be disrupted without physically closing those rates as we've seen in the strata moves. Insurers, crews, and operators may withdraw because the risk becomes commercially unacceptable, but the threshold for economic disruption is also much lower than the threshold for a military control of the waterway. And with the compounded effect of the Strait Of Omeus and the Badal Mandan Strait, the impact would be global. So we have three different ways of escalate... Of escalating this conflict to the region Wow. in the. world. Yeah. Very clear, Dyan. Thank you. Thank you. Jackson, let me turn to you on this one with your kind of operational hat on. Listening to Dyan, what are the organizational triggers for escalation? And what should, corporate security posture be moving forward? I know you and the security ops team are filling similar questions on a daily basis. So what would you like to offer here? That's correct. And in terms of what the situation looks like now as opposed to, let's say, over the summer, whereas now Saudi is under the light a little bit more. A lot of the organizational triggers for escalation or changing of posture for business will remain the same, if not have tighter, definitions to them. We wanna keep triggers simple for organizations, and we want them to be observable. The fastest way for business to come under risk is if you're debating on whether something counts as an escalation or if it doesn't. So having these triggers laid out beforehand will help you, better stage a response when when needing to actually action. For these triggers, posture shifts are usually tied to to major disruptions, as Dyan has already pointed out, both to aviation and maritime. For aviation disruptions, this comes in the form of air space changes, frequent cancellations, airport access constraints, and as we've seen in recent times, even severe airport damage. For the case of Saudi, this would be, even more so for places like Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam. For maritime disruption, this would be wider, broader disruptions than we've seen. Threats or incidents that materially affect key economic lanes. That's when supply chain stock accelerates. That's when, businesses should be concerned. Widening of the impact areas. We've seen this a little bit in Saudi, but even more so, if activity is spreading into new areas that matter to, your business footprint, this can be commercial hubs, key border crossings, or other key corridors. Government directives, such as sheltering guidance, severe movement restrictions, or rapidly changing visa entry, rules, and spillover into daily life, civilian impact, significant demonstrations, transport strikes, etcetera within cities. Once you understand these triggers from a business perspective, you can then lay out a staged operational response. This can be in the form of moving towards heightened monitoring processes, with tighter check ins with with employees and and travelers alike. This can be applying targeted movement controls, such as moving only during daylight hours, using trusted transportation, using key corridors and having them laid out beforehand in a plan, pausing nonessential activity if operating in the region, and lastly, executing preplanned shelter in place, internal relocation, or full on evacuation, when you have a viable window. Thanks, Jackson. That is, that's powerful. Just the framework you've laid out, clear, simple, actionable. I think that's the the the right the right direction to go. So thank you for that. Dyan, let's stay in the space of of escalation here. When when it comes to escalation, do you see the conflict spreading region wide? And and how are Saudi Arabia, The UAE, and Israel weighing the cost of escalation against the risk of appearing unwilling to respond? That's a good question. Well, I will start by saying the conflict has technically already... Has regional consequences. Further internationalization is plausible, but a unified regional war is not inevitable. So like I said, we have seen in the last couple days statements from Britain announcing air air defense support to to Saudi Arabia. Egypt has also announced assistance. The UAE have also stated that they will start funding the... Funding again, sorry, the Southern Giant Brigades, one of the main forces fighting the Ahoutis in Southwest of Yemen. Pakistan, France, or even Turkey have also pledged some kind of defenses... Defensive support for Saudi Arabia. So it is spreading internationally with some actors. It has also visual consequences, like Jackson said, with most notably in terms of aviation with airlines rerouting planes around Saudi Arabia airspace. The economic cost is also increasing with the dual choke point of Hormuz and Baba Mandev. And we just talked previously of how the conflict should further expand. Now how are the countries weighing their options? And that's really tricky. So Saudi Arabia obviously faces a credibility and economic security dilemma, and they are weighing their options because on one hand, repeated attacks can undermine confidence in the kingdom, safety, and investment plans as we've already seen. Yet an expensive response risk additional retaliation and prolonged exposure to conflicts. The most plausible approach is for them continued air operations, stronger protection of critical sites, and support VMA partners while keeping diplomatic channels available because, like we said, they wanna increase merger pressure for the purpose of diplomacy. So it is a calculated balance. It is it is a difficult balance to keep, but it's what they are keeping at the moment. Now you mentioned The UAE. It's important to remember that The UAE report were... They were part of the initial, international coalition in twenty fourteen, twenty fifteen. They had supported for over a decade, southern forces in the fight against the Houthis, but also against Al Qaeda. They were an important partner of Saudi Arabia, but they they had, some, differences at the end of last year, especially in December. And they withdrew the support of the southern forces, which integrated the Yemeni forces as a whole, and they are part of it. So they're still fighting against the Houthis, but mostly with Saudi support. Now The UAE are saying that they are back into funding the southern, giant rukis, which are one of the main, like I said, forces fighting the Houthis. It shows renewed involvement through Yemeni formations, but also with the cooperation of Saudi Arabia despite the continued Saudi American settlements. Now, financing and enabling Yemeni forces allows Abu Dhabi to influence events while limiting direct exposure. The risk of attacks against UAE will likely be lower if Abu Dhabi if Abu Dhabi limits its involvement to financial and logistical supports than if it's conducted direct as... Ace rights like they did in 2014 and 2015. However, indirect involvement will not eliminate the threat of expansion of the conflict, especially if The UAE backed forces inflict significant battlefield losses on the Ahuputhis and if the Houthis per... Perceive it as a direct involvement of the of The UAE. We know that the Houthis have the capabilities to reach Abu Dhabi and to reach Dubai. They've done it before. But at the moment, they have not, stated that UAE are one of the main, enemies on their list compared to Saudi Arabia. So it's a different balance for them because it also about... It's also about protecting their integrity. They don't want to become another target for the for the Al Houthis. Now you also mentioned Israel's. Israel's calculation is also a bit different. We know that they have previously struck the Al Houthis leadership and infrastructure following attacks on Israeli territory in 2024 and 2025. Those operations did not eliminate the movement's ability to threaten regional targets, but it made a significant impact. It was a joint, Israeli, US, and UK, campaign, and it was it was in response of, like I said, direct target in the territory. At the moment, the Houthis have pledged to the Americans that they would not target Israel, but it is. It could change at any moment. Reports indicate that Israel is, or might be getting ready to prepare some some kind of response in partners with The US. It isn't clear if it would be with the, with Saudi Arabia support, because we do know the relations of those of those two countries. But another serious attack could generate pressure for retaliation, especially, like I said, if an aircraft is being targeted. But Israel action would pursue Israeli security objectives, which might be different. Additionally, and that's an important point, over the alignment between, Tel Aviv and Riyadh could complicate Riyadh's regional diplomacy and strengthen the Houthis claim that they are resisting a common external enemy that is aligned with The US and Israel, which is one of the reason why Saudi Arabia has reportedly refused any kind of help coming from Israel. So to conclude, each country's ways is participation in terms of cost not only for the region and the global economy that impacts everyone, but also direct exposure to the conflict, making an international coalition more likely to emerge through separate commitments commitments of different countries than a single comment. Oh, that makes sense. It did. Very clear. It just... There's so many moving parts, Nina, and I just... It just made me think about the complexity of that of that region and also how important it is to have expertise like yourselves, like yourself and Jackson to really understand how it all fits together. So, and I'm not gonna let you off the hook because I have another question too. So we've talked about the region and I wanna just, we have to address Iran. You know, so how much influence, does Tehran have over Houthi decision making? And where where might their interest diverge? What are your thoughts on that? Well, that's interesting because there's been some some comments and some some reports emerging. So let's talk about the facts. Iran has a substantial influence over the Houthis in terms of capabilities that is clear, But influence does not establish control, and the Houthis have also a local and country level objective that is not directly linked to Iran. So factually, it was established that Iran has supported the Houthis for over decades in terms of weapons, expertise, and training. Reports indicate that now the al Houthis can also, thanks to this knowledge, manufacture their own weaponry, especially drones. Iranian supports, interacts with the local military organization, but it also in terms of financing. Now Tehran can affect capabilities and incentives without exerting continuous comment over targeting and timing. It has supported the movement. That is clear. But it's also clear that is... This cooperation has expanded further than just Tehran. We've seen that this increasing cooperation within the axis of resistance, and we've seen this just last month during the attack on the East West pipeline. It was an attack launched from Iraq, most likely from Shia militia based in Iraq that are supported... That are part of the access of resistance, from Iran. And it was launched in coordination, most likely, with the Houthis. So we're seeing cooperation that does not bypass Iran, but just goes further than just direct contact with Tehran. Now that is facts. But then you... As you mentioned, there are interest, and interest might diverge. What is what is clear that their interest overlaps in terms of imposing costs on Saudi Arabia, The United States, and the international community. That is clear Iran benefits when its adversaries must defend additional fronts, especially Saudi Arabia. The Houthis benefit from the support, regional prominence, and stronger bargaining power over Yemen's future, particularly in... When you think about imposing a dual choke point on Saudi Arabia. And that's what is happening. So that's where the interests do align because it's increasing bargaining power for both Iran and the Houthis. Now the interests can divert over timing and acceptable risks because while those funds are related, they're not directly linked. Iran might favor restraint to secure a wider agreement while the Houthis see an opportunity around Taiz, Omarib, or territorial expansion. Conversely, if the Houthis leader prefer a local arrangement that protects the territorial expansion, that might be against Tehran, wants to continuing ritual pressure. So it's a bargaining between them too. It's a balance of power. And this is why those two prices, like I said, are related but not directly linked. A ceasefire on one theater, for example, in Yemen, does not imply that the end of the stories are happening in the other theater, especially in the Strait Of Hormuz and vice versa? If there's a if there's a ceasefire in the Strait Of Hormuz, that doesn't mean that it's gonna be... It's gonna stop in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. But, however... And that's important. An escalation in one of those theater could imply an escalation in the other in the near term, and that's why we say they're related. Unless a continued escalation in Yemen and in Saudi Arabia could force The US to get involved, and then the war could expand and reignite the regional conflict, around the Strait Of Hormuz and with Iran. So those two crises are related, but not directly linked. That mean... Yeah. That makes sense. It's really important to understand the the dynamic and the synergy between all those different actors. So you laid it out very clear. Thank... Thanks, Dyan. Jackson, if I could turn to you. As I as I mentioned earlier in the kickoff, the end game in The Middle East, it's it's uncertain as as Dyan has also laid out. What long term operational advice would you offer businesses in Saudi Arabia today? Yeah. Well, so business, is continuing in some form throughout The Middle East. Should should your business be continuing or be unavoidable. There are a few finer points, that you as an organization should should focus on, not only to ensure your traveler's safety, but so that stronger business continuity can exist for not only prolonged issues in in Saudi, but just across The Gulf in general. Monitoring and preparing for continued airspace disruption and closure is one of the first points, I'd like to speak on. Communication outages and, airspace disruptions and and targeting can occur at a moment's notice. So it's it's always good to have that in mind and keep that in play when when discussing long term business here. Setting clear accountability and communication for all your travelers and all your business employees is very important for continued business, as well as expanding your contingencies so that not only rerouting and deferring of travel is covered, but also support for interregional travel or in country personnel should your operations be continuing. Site individuals who who are more subject to highly minimized movement or even fully restricted movement in in large scale attacks. For most organizations, the question here isn't really, is it safe to continue operations in in our location? It's more of, is it safe enough for this activity in this place to continue with the controls that are happening. So there there are four big conditions here that we look out for when looking for a safer operating environment over the long term. The first one being predictable access and mobility. Before you continue your operations, you need basic reliability. This is in all spheres such as airspace, airports, road access, and border procedures. It doesn't have to be perfect. It just has to be predictable enough in its nature that you can prepare and plan movement and operations without constant changes and constant impacts to your to your operations. Second would be sustained movement, not just a single day low. We can look at recent examples such as the the targeting of the Riyadh Airport. After events like this, it's important to accept that there's going to be a new baseline. So a back to normal or a continued operation environment might not look like what it did, pre crisis or pre event even in this case. What we look for is a more tangible improvement that holds. We're thinking in terms of days and weeks, not just seconds and hours. Stable operating patterns and consistent guidance from authorities can also bolster this with no rapid swing back and forth between, minimized movement and restrictions coming from them, which leads into, just getting clear rules and clear directives from authorities. This will be local authorities, airlines, and ports where their guidance is consistent and enforceable. It simply reduces uncertainty. If their guidance is contradictory or if it differs from from day to day, you're still in a volatility phase and should treat continued operations as limited and tightly controlled. Fourth point here just being robust contingency planning and internal readiness. Continuing operations is only as safe as your ability to support it. That means ensuring you have these contingencies in place, ensuring you have business continuity, and ensuring you have evacuation plans in place should the situation escalate beyond your triggers, including elements such as simple check ins for your travelers. It may seem simple enough, but robust communications is very important for these types of operations. Having trusted transport and movement plans with alternatives, having hotels or sites that can support short shelter in place periods or full on relocation periods, having medical access plans and comms redundancies, as well as leadership agreements on your escalation triggers, especially the ones that we spoke about earlier here. Lastly, if we're looking for a simple continued operations or return to operations checklist for leaders that organizations should have, It's talking about what's your location posture. This needs to be city and state specific. What's your exposure profile? This can be, types of employees, executives, engineers, contractors, maritime crews, but also their nationalities. Are they local citizens? Are they expats? Are they business travelers? What's your corridor plan? Is this an airport to hotel to site movement that continues throughout The Middle East? What are your alternatives? What are your safe havens? What is your pause rule? This goes back to some of the triggers. What's gonna make you stop your operations today? And then lastly, what is your support model? This can be security support, communication support, medical, and lastly, evac, operations, or relocation. Thanks. Thanks, Jackson. All all very clear. I mean, I I heard a lot of planning there, this concept of the new baseline and how to operate. Your four conditions are are very clear, and I I I suspect very useful for organizations. So thanks for sharing that. Dyan, to you, I've been accused of being an internal optimist. You know me. I have to say that developments in The Middle East, to be honest with you, leave me a little room for optimism, at least right now where we are today. But with that, we have to talk about de escalation. It goes back to what Jackson's talking about in terms of planning, both from escalation and de escalation and accepting what Jackson termed as the new normal. So my last question for you is, what would a credible diplomatic off ramp look like? Who could broker it? And what early signs would indicate that the parties are ready to actually step back? Well, you're right to say that it is little room for optimism, but a credible off ramp, will have to have significant steps. So it will... First of all, it would have to include an exchange of very false... Verifiable security restraints and tangible economic relief, both in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However... And that's a big... However, a ceasefire in Yemen, like I said, would not guarantee a long term cessation of facilities in the region, especially as long as The US Iran conflict has not be formally resolved. So temporary rejection of facilities does not equate long term stability. But keeping optimism, a credible offering would have significant steps. So first, like I said, it would need to start by negotiating a a limited reciprocal cessation of attacks. So it would mean stopping cross border missile and drone attacks both from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, but also Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Attacks on commercial shipping would need to be stopped. The embargo on, Saudi, tankers in all commercial shipping in the rescue will also have to be lifted. And Saudi's air strikes in Yemen and the actual front lines will need to be frozen in Yemen. Second, this will need to be consolidated by practical improvements. So we need to negotiate monitored arrangements for civilian flights, commercial imports, and shoulder deliveries in Yemen, address as well, the Houthis grievances on public sector salaries, which had been addressed, I have to say, back in 2022, 2023 when they were negotiating with Saudi Arabia, and finally also open humanitarian access and civilian routes around Taiz, but also Aden with protections against either side using depots to consolidate a siege on either cities. So we need to have a secession of hostilities with practical improvements on the ground, and then, we would need to prevent a bilateral deal from excluding Yemen's other constituencies. We talked before about the southern forces, which are critical in fighting the Houthis at the moment. We need to be careful there is Saudi Houthi agreement that could reduce post border attacks, include also with the Yemeni governments as well as southern actors and other Yemeni constituencies to implement a meaningful pass... Participation in a wider process addressing all grievances and actually resolving the Yemen war. So that is a lot of optimism, but excluding those groups would, implement incentives to obstruct implementation of the ceasefire and would create incentives to disrupt the peace process. So that's why you need the three steps. Not at the same time, but you need to have a plan for all of those three. Now who could procure it? The most likely broker would be Oman because they're already involved in the Saudi community communication at the moment. Israeli ministry have publicly confirmed coordination with Saudi Arabia, Yemeni parties, but also the UN envoy, for Yemen, restoring the political process. Now this would be the main, partner for procuring the peace process, but it doesn't mean it would be the only one. You most likely would need two other partners. The main one would be The UAE to help secure implementation by the human partners in the South because they are the most trusted, partner for the South. There's been some differences between, especially, southern forces and, Saudi Arabia since December. So we would need The UAE to broker the deal with all parties, and we would most likely need Iran to, also support restraint and accept explicit commitments to to the, Houthi to stop, attacks, especially if there is a new conflict in the other side of the peninsula in the Strait Of Ramuz. So you probably need the the other two. Coordination with the wider, Iran US track would also help, especially, for protection and comprehensive regional, bargain. Now we talked about some triggers for de escalation that we could see and and would give us hope. The first one would be a sustained decline in launches and earthquakes over the several weeks. A confirmed one would be good too. The second one will be on the diplomatic track that would be confirmed technical meetings with, the Omani delegations, Saudi delegations, Al Houthis, and Yemeni co co... Delegations that could empower negotiators and, publish an agreed agenda on negotiations, that would be good. On the maritime front, that would also mean, like I said, the limited... The lifting of threats against commercial shipping and the withdrawal of the embargo against Saudi shipping. And just to conclude, I think the strongest sign of the escalation will be implemented arrangement that protect people and commerce sustained long enough to demonstrate that restraint is becoming a strategy choice and not just a temporary, strategy. Yeah. Very, very informative. Very sobering too. It makes me think it's somewhat... I... I've heard this before. It's easy to start a war, but difficult to end. And I think the way you described, the different triggers and how it might evolve, I think showcases the complexity around it. Dyan, Jackson, thank you both for your insights today. I think, you've given us a lot to consider, both in terms of the broader regional dynamics and... But also what these developments mean on the ground. And and Jackson, just the way you laid out so clearly the conditions for those wanting to operate in the new normal, I think was, very, very important. As we've discussed, as as Dyan, you've you've highlighted, there's still many unanswered questions about where this conflict is heading. There's the calculations in Washington, Tehran, Riyadh, the Houthis. They're they're all gonna be critical in determining what's next. And behind as a backdrop, the US midterm elections are approaching. So there's domestic political considerations here in The US. And as well, Dyan, I know you're falling closely, elections in Israel as well. So there's a number of, quite big developments that are happening. And I think there are a few important takeaways. First, the regional security environment remains highly fluid. It goes without saying. And the potential for further escalation, Dyan, you mentioned is is quite real. We've seen firsthand and and you've highlighted how developments in one part of The Middle East can have that follow on and carry on effects in others. So I'd say it makes it especially important to stay ahead of the developments, and we're lucky to have people such as yourself, Dyan, to follow it so closely to regularly access, reassess exposure, ensure that, as Jackson mentioned, contingency plans reflect the changing environment. And it's important to also understand the intentions and capabilities of the key actors, just as important as monitoring the day to day events on the ground. So for those those on the call at Crisis24, our intelligence security operations, we're gonna continue doing what we do best. We're gonna monitor developments. We're gonna look ahead across the horizon to emerging risks and and help our partners and those on the call make informed decisions. So I wanna thank all those on the call for joining us to this discussion. We appreciate your time, your trust, and your continued partnership. And importantly, Dyan Jackson, thank you. Take care. Okay. Thank you.